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I. INTRODUCTION
At best, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment proportionality jurisprudence has been fractured and uncertain since its inception.1 This has lead to uncertainty in sentencing, as well as questions
regarding the constitutionality of many sentences. However, with the
Court’s recent landmark decision in Graham v. Florida,2 the Court
revived its proportionality analysis and seemingly breathed new life
into it, enunciating a somewhat different approach to scrutinizing
sentence constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment.
The Court’s approach in Graham focused on three factors for assessing a sentence’s constitutionality: the offender, the sentence, and
the crime.3 Using these three factors, the Court ultimately held that
life without parole (“LWOP”) for a juvenile who did not commit homicide is unconstitutional, categorically banning such a sentence in the
United States.4 And while the holding in Graham is extremely important and a step in the right direction, broader applicability of the
Court’s analytical framework is uncertain given the proportionality

∗ J.D., Florida State University College of Law. I would like to thank my fiancé,
Kaylie, for her support, love, and patience throughout my time in law school.
1. Donna H. Lee, Resuscitating Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing,
40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527, 528 (2008) (arguing that the last twenty-five years of Supreme Court
proportionality decisions “do not provide practical guidance or a coherent theoretical
framework for analyzing proportionality challenges”).
2. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
3. Id. at 2026–30.
4. Id. at 2034.
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principle’s dubious past.5 Therefore, this Note argues that the Graham decision provides a workable, fair, and robust analytical framework for the Court to apply when evaluating all LWOP sentences
moving forward. To that end, Part II provides the background and
context of the Graham decision, so that the underlying theoretical
and factual bases are well understood, followed by an analysis of the
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence leading up to Graham.
Next, Part III outlines the appropriate analytical framework and its
justifications, with Part IV addressing potential concerns that may
be raised contrary to my position in this article. Part V concludes this
Note with a summary of my analysis.
II. GRAHAM: CONTEXT, PRINCIPLES, AND ANALYSIS
The Graham Court was faced squarely with the issue of whether
LWOP for a juvenile who committed a nonhomicidal crime is constitutional under the Eighth Amendment.6 In answering this question,
the Court focused mainly on its own precedent and the legislative
posture of the individual states.7 However, for purposes of this Note,
it is extremely important to understand the history and context not
only of the Court’s precedent and national conceptions of juvenile
punishment, but also the underlying principles of juvenile justice, as
this is helpful in understanding the Court’s treatment of young offenders and the foundational ideas about why an offender’s status as
a juvenile entitles them to different treatment than their adult counterparts. After explaining these justifications, the factual and procedural background of the Graham decision will briefly be explained to
properly elucidate the issues before the Court, followed by an analysis of the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence prior to Graham.
A. Principles of the Juvenile Justice System
When the juvenile justice system was first created in the United
States in the early twentieth century, rehabilitation for young offenders was initially the guiding principle, based largely on the idea
that juveniles are less mature in their ability to make moral judgments, and that juveniles have the potential for being channeled
away from further criminal conduct.8 However, as more substantive
5. Compare, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (forbidding the imposition of
the death penalty for any individual under eighteen at the time the crime was committed)
with Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality opinion) (upholding a sentence
of LWOP for possession of 672 grams of cocaine).
6. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018.
7. It is important to note that while the Court found that a majority of states allowed
juvenile LWOP for nonhomicidal crimes, the Court still went on to find the sentence unconstitutional. Id. at 2023–27.
8. Since its inception, the juvenile justice system has countered the stark differences
between youth and adults through “individual assessment and treatment” of children in an
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and procedural rights have been afforded juveniles,9 juveniles have
concomitantly been held to a higher degree of culpability, often being
held to the same level as adults, which is most often seen when minors are “waived” into adult court proceedings.10 These waivers into
adult courts carry with them adult sanctions,11 such as LWOP,12 and
until 2005, even the death penalty.13 But a chorus of scholars is adamantly critical of such harsh treatment for juveniles,14 citing minors’
immaturity, as well as their potential for growth into productive,
noncriminal citizens, as mitigating the need to retributively punish
youthful offenders.15 Moreover, only fourteen other countries in the
world allow LWOP for juveniles,16 and the international community
has condemned the practice.17 But despite such outspoken criticism,
most states have statutes authorizing LWOP for juveniles: sixteen
states impose juvenile LWOP as a mandatory sentence for certain
enumerated crimes18 and nineteen states allow juvenile LWOP on a

effort to reintegrate young offenders into society. C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the
Bathwater: Adolescent Offending and Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REV.
659, 667 (2005); Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life Without
Parole on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681, 685 (1998); Ralph A. Rossum, Holding
Juveniles Accountable: Reforming America’s “Juvenile Injustice System,” 22 PEPP. L. REV.
907, 909–11 (1995).
9. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1967) (holding that juvenile proceedings
must, inter alia, comply with Fourteenth Amendment requirements); Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541, 561–62 (1966) (holding that certain due process standards apply to juveniles).
10. Logan, supra note 8, at 685–89.
11. See id. at 689 (noting that the common perception is that “[o]nce waived into adult
court, a juvenile offender is deemed an adult, and therefore, the thinking goes, should be
treated like one”). Professor Logan goes on to say that courts typically rationalize imposing
adult sanctions on juveniles by asserting that “punishment is a legislative prerogative--and
that society is well within its rights to impose harsh punishment on juvenile offenders in
response to their atrocious crimes.” Id. at 722.
12. Id. at 689–90.
13. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that crimes committed before
the eighteenth birthday cannot subject an individual to the death penalty).
14. See generally Elizabeth Cepparulo, Roper v. Simmons: Unveiling Juvenile Purgatory: Is Life Really Better Than Death?, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 225, 226–27
(2006) (asserting that LWOP for juveniles is equivalent to the death penalty); Hillary J.
Massey, Disposing of Children: The Eighth Amendment and Juvenile Life Without Parole
After Roper, 47 B.C. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (2006) (proclaiming juvenile LWOP as unconstitutionally harsh); Dirk van Zyl Smit, The Abolition of Capital Punishment for Persons Under
the Age of Eighteen Years in the United States of America. What Next?, 5 HUM. RTS. L. REV.
393, 401 (2005) (advancing the idea that basic human dignity should prevent LWOP for
juveniles).
15. Victor Streib & Bernadette Schrempp, Life Without Parole for Children, 21 CRIM.
JUST. 4, 4–5 (2007).
16. Massey, supra note 14, at 1084–85 (citing AMNESTY INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1 (2005), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/162/2005/en/209dd2dad4a1-11dd-8a23-d58a49c0d652/amr511622005en.pdf.
17. Streib & Schrempp, supra note 15, at 11-12.
18. Id. at 10.
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discretionary basis;19 only nine states and Washington, D.C. altogether disallow LWOP for juveniles.20
The vast majority of cases handing down LWOP for juveniles involved homicide committed by the child, often provoking a visceral
public outcry for the harshest of sentences.21 For example, consider
the case of Joshua Phillips of Jacksonville, Florida. Phillips, a fourteen-year-old, stabbed his eight-year-old neighbor, Maddie Clifton, to
death and then hid her body in the frame of his waterbed for more
than a week.22 After Joshua’s conviction for first-degree murder, the
trial court judge told him during the sentencing hearing that “I'm
certain that on Judgment Day, you, Joshua Earl Phillips, will be given a far harsher sentence than I can impose.” Adding a biblical reference, the judge found that, “[i]t would be better if a millstone were
hung around your neck and that you were thrown into [the] sea than
to cause harm to a child.”23 Joshua Phillips was sentenced to life in
prison without parole, with his conviction and sentence both affirmed
on appeal.24
The judge’s remarks are perfect illustrations of the basic, deepseated anger that so frequently surfaces when a juvenile commits
murder, as the offender is no longer seen as a child, but as a depraved pariah embodying all of the pernicious traits of a hardened,
irredeemable criminal. However, while murdering someone, especially a child, can understandably elicit such raw emotion, nonhomicide offenses fall into a grey area, where the juveniles’ crimes are
egregious and can certainly evoke scornful emotion, but the child’s
age and immaturity may mitigate the need for sentencing the offender to LWOP.

19. Id. Additionally, six other states allow mandatory LWOP for juveniles after certain other factors are proven at trial. Id.
20. Id. at 9.
21. Id. at 4 (citing Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (twelve-year-old
sentenced to LWOP for murder); Commonwealth v. Kocher, 602 A.2d 1308 (Pa. 1992) (nineyear-old arraigned for murder and sentenced to LWOP); State v. Massey, 803 P.2d 340
(Wash. Ct. Ap. 1990) (thirteen-year-old sentenced to LWOP for robbery-murder).
22. Kathleen Sweeney, Joshua Phillips Sentencing, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Aug. 20, 1999,
available at http://jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/082099/met_082099maddie.html.
23. Id.
24. Phillips v. State, 807 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), rev. denied, 823 So. 2d 125
(Fla. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1161 (2003). The Second District Court of Appeal discussed and applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment proportionality jurisprudence and held that even though “Phillips’ culpability may be diminished somewhat because of his age . . . the factor of his age is outweighed by his heinous conduct and the ultimate harm-death-that he inflicted upon his victim,” ultimately ruling that the sentence of
life imprisonment for the specific intent crime of first-degree murder cannot be disproportionate. Id. at 718.
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B. Graham: Factual and Procedural Background
The story of Mr. Graham’s life is a sad tale. Born January 6, 1987,
to parents who were both addicted to crack cocaine, Graham began
using tobacco at age nine and marijuana at age thirteen.25 Graham’s
first run-in with the legal system occurred in July 2003, when Graham and three accomplices attempted to rob a barbeque restaurant.
Though their robbery attempt was foiled, Graham was ultimately
arrested and charged as an adult for his involvement.26 While the
court withheld adjudication of guilt as to the charges of armed burglary with assault or battery, as well as attempted armed-robbery,
Graham received concurrent three-year terms of probation per his
plea agreement and was released from jail on June 25, 2004.27
Despite Graham’s assertions to the trial court that he intended to
“turn . . . [his] life around,” Graham was again arrested on December
2, 2004, for his involvement in a home invasion robbery where Graham forcibly entered a home and held the resident at gunpoint while
Graham’s cohorts ransacked the home for money and valuables.28
The trial court found Graham guilty of armed burglary, and attempted armed robbery, sentencing Graham to “the maximum sentence authorized by law on each charge: life imprisonment for the
armed burglary and 15 years for the attempted armed robbery.”29 At
the sentencing hearing, the court explained that “[g]iven . . . [Graham’s] escalating pattern of criminal conduct, it is apparent . . . that
this is the way . . . [Graham is] going to live . . . [his] life and that the
only thing I can do now is to try and protect the community from . . .
[Graham’s] actions.”30 And as Florida abolished its parole system,31
Graham’s life sentence carried with it no possibility of release without being granted executive clemency. Graham was seventeen years
old the night that he committed the robbery. 32

25. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2010).
26. Id. During the attempted robbery, the manager was assaulted with a metal bar,
and so the “charges against Graham were armed burglary with assault or battery, a firstdegree felony carrying a maximum penalty of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole . . . and attempted armed-robbery, a second-degree felony carrying a maximum penalty of 15 years’ imprisonment.” Id.
27. Id. at 2018.
28. Id. at 2018–19. Further, the State alleged that Graham and his compatriots were
involved in a second armed robbery later that same night, during which one of Graham’s
accomplices was shot; Graham took the man to the hospital and dropped him off, subsequently being arrested after running into a telephone pole while trying to evade police
officers. Id. at 2019.
29. Id. at 2020.
30. Id.
31. See FLA. STAT. § 921.002(1)(e) (2010).
32. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2019.
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Graham subsequently appealed his sentence as unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment, with the First District Court of Appeal affirming the trial court’s decision.33 In its opinion, the intermediate appellate court stated that Graham’s original probation sentence was “extremely lenient”34 considering Graham committed a potential life-in-prison felony. Further, because Graham had personally “held a gun to a man’s head during the incident” and “committed
at least two armed robberies and confessed to the commission of an
additional three,” Graham’s sentence was not disproportionate to his
crimes.35 Following the First District’s ruling, the Florida Supreme
Court denied review,36 with the Supreme Court of the United States
subsequently granting certiorari.
C. Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
The United States Constitution, through the Eighth Amendment,
proscribes punishment that is “cruel and unusual”37—applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.38 However, prior to
Graham, state courts were split on whether or not juvenile LWOP
was unconstitutional: Kentucky,39 Nevada,40 and California41 all considered the sentence impermissible, while South Carolina,42 Ohio,43
and Florida44 each upheld the sentence. And while the federal appellate courts had not ruled on the issue since Roper,45 the Ninth Circuit

33. Graham v. State, 982 So. 2d 43, 54 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).
34. Id. at 52.
35. Id. The First District Court of Appeal also addressed the issue of rehabilitation for
Graham, finding that “[w]hile the United States Supreme Court has noted that juveniles in
general are more amenable to successful rehabilitation,” Graham had been given a fair
chance at rehabilitation when he was given probation for his felony crimes as a seventeen-yearold; the Court held that Graham “rejected his second chance and chose to continue committing crimes at an escalating pace,” warranting the trial court’s chosen punishment. Id.
36. Graham v. State, 990 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 2008).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. “The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
39. Workman v. Kentucky, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1968) (noting that because it is
not possible to know whether or not a fourteen-year-old will be able to reform later in life,
LWOP is cruel and unusual for such a young offender).
40. Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 946–47 (Nev. 1989) (overturning LWOP for a
thirteen-year-old offender, noting that juveniles should be judged by different standards
than mature adults).
41. In re Nunez, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242, 265 (Cal. 4th Ct. App. 2009) (finding that LWOP for
a fourteen-year-old nonhomicide offender is cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment).
42. State v. Standard, 569 S.E.2d 325, 329 (S.C. 2002) (holding that LWOP does not
violate contemporary standards of decency, and is therefore constitutional as applied to a
fifteen-year-old juvenile).
43. State v. Warren, 887 N.E.2d 1145, 1154 (Ohio 2008) (affirming a LWOP sentence
for a fifteen-year-old, nonhomicide offender).
44. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 54–55 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (holding that LWOP for a
twelve-year-old does not violate the Eighth Amendment).
45. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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previously held in Harris v. Wright46 that LWOP is permitted under
the Eighth Amendment for a fifteen-year-old offender.47
Although the Supreme Court has developed its own Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, prior to Graham, the Court had yet to
directly rule as to the constitutionality of LWOP for nonhomicide juvenile offenders. Therefore, the following two sections explore the
Court’s precedent and analysis of the Eighth Amendment leading up
to the decision in Graham.
1. The Proportionality Principle
The Supreme Court has struggled to firmly determine whether or
not the Eighth Amendment contains a proportionality principle for
application to non-capital sentences, and, if such a standard exists,
how its parameters should be defined.48 First, in Weems v. United
States,49 the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited sentencing a fifteen-year-old to twelve years hard labor in chains for falsifying a public document, because “the mischief and the remedy”
were disproportionate.50 Upholding this line of reasoning some five
decades later, the Court reiterated and further enunciated the proportionality principle in Robinson v. California,51 focusing its ruling
on the proportionality of a certain crime with a certain punishment,
and stating that although in the abstract a given punishment may
not be unconstitutional, applied to a particular crime it may well be.52
Next, in Rummel v. Estelle,53 the Court held that a state could sentence a repeat offender to life in prison with the possibility of parole
for minor property theft without violating the Eighth Amendment,
basically espousing the view that a proportionality analysis did not

46. 93 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 1996).
47. Id. at 585-86 (affirming LWOP for a fifteen-year-old homicide offender).
48. Barry C. Feld, A Slower Form of Death: Implications of Roper v. Simmons for Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 9, 9–11
(2008) (discussing life in prison without parole for juveniles). See generally Bruce Campbell, Proportionality and the Eighth Amendment: Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680
(1991), 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 284, 285–95 (1992) (providing in-depth discussion regarding each Justice’s treatment of the proportionality principle); Steven Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing: The Supreme Court’s Tortured Approach to Cruel
and Unusual Punishment, 84 KY. L.J. 107, 146 (1996) (discussing the background and various opinions applying the proportionality principle).
49. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
50. Id. at 379. The Court stated that it is a “fundamental law” that “punishment for
crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense.” Id. at 367.
51. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
52. Explaining its rationale, the Court stated: “[t]o be sure, imprisonment for ninety
days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual,” but applied to
specific facts it could be, since “one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment
for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.” Id. at 667.
53. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
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apply to nonhomicide sentences.54 “Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular
sentences have been exceedingly rare,”55 wrote Justice William
Rehnquist. He continued, “We all, of course, would like to think that
we are ‘moving down the road toward human decency.’ . . . [H]owever,
we have no way of knowing in which direction that road lies,” concluding that the federal courts must defer to state legislatures and
their sentencing regimes.56
However, three years later in Solem v. Helm,57 the Court found
that a life sentence without parole for a habitual perpetrator of minor
property crimes violated the Constitution.58 Despite the seemingly
identical facts, the Court applied its “deeply rooted and frequently
repeated” proportionality analysis.59 In arriving at its ruling, the
Solem Court used three factors to evaluate the proportionality of the
sentence to the crime: “(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in
the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission
of the same crime in other jurisdictions.”60 If, after weighing these
factors together, the punishment is “significantly disproportionate” to
the crime, then the punishment is anathema to the Eighth Amendment and unconstitutional.61
However, the Court again changed direction in Harmelin v.
Michigan.62 The Court issued a plurality opinion with Justice Scalia
straying from the Solem analysis, applying instead his originalist
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.63 Justice Scalia reasoned
that the drafters of the Eighth Amendment intended it as a check on
the ability of Congress to authorize particular methods of punishment, rather than as a guarantee against disproportionate sentences.64 Further, Justice Scalia specifically renounced the first two
Solem factors as affording judges an inappropriate amount of personal discretion to influence their interpretations of sentences.65
Scalia then touted the third Solem factor as having “no conceivable

54. Id. at 284–85. Rummel was sentenced to life in prison under a Texas recidivist
statute for his third charge of felony theft after stealing $120.75. Id. at 266.
55. Id. at 272.
56. Id. at 283–84 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 410 (1972) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting)).
57. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
58. Id. at 303.
59. Id. at 284.
60. Id. at 292.
61. Id. at 303.
62. 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality opinion).
63. See id. at 961–96 (at times discussing the intent of the drafters, as well as historical
context existing during drafting period).
64. Id. at 976.
65. Id.
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relevance to the Eighth Amendment.”66 However, Justice Scalia’s
opinion seems to invoke circular reasoning, as he states that the
Court’s only province is to provide a check on the legislature against
authorizing “cruel methods of punishment that are not regularly or
customarily employed,”67 while criticizing the second two Solem factors in part because there is “no objective standard of gravity.”68
Therefore, Justice Scalia’s position seems to be that the Court cannot
decide whether or not a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because there are no standards, and the Court cannot create or establish standards because defining a standard inserts the Court’s subjective interpretations; ergo, nothing can be cruel and unusual.
In contrast, Justice Kennedy’s separate Harmelin concurrence asserted that “[t]he Eighth Amendment proportionality principle also
applies to noncapital sentences,”69 and that his analysis, using the
three Solem factors, is the correct methodology for scrutinizing
Eighth Amendment challenges.70 However, Justice Kennedy also asserted that “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence,”71 but rather “[the Eighth
Amendment] forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.”72
The seeds of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence found fertile ground in
which to flourish in Ewing v. California,73 where the Court held that
the Eighth Amendment in fact “contains a ‘narrow proportionality
principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences,’ ”74 even though the
Court ultimately upheld Ewing’s sentence of twenty-five years to life
in prison for the theft of three golf clubs.75 Writing for the majority,
Justice O’Conner reemphasized the language from Harmelin that
successful challenges under the rubric of disproportionality should be
“exceedingly rare.”76
As one can ascertain from the decisions leading up to Graham, the
exact parameters of the Court’s nonhomicide jurisprudence were uncertain; indeed, the Court had flip-flopped between rules so frequently that the rules themselves were essentially unknown. However, there existed prior to Graham another set of rules, a set of rules
that, while newer than the proportionality principle, played a significant role in informing the Court’s conclusions in Graham.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 988.
Id. at 976.
Id. at 988.
Id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 996–1001.
Id. at 1001.
Id. (quoting Solem v Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288, 303 (1983)).
538 U.S. 11 (2003) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 20 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996-97).
Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 21 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)).
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2. The National Consensus and Evolving Standards of Decency
As mentioned previously, Roper v. Simmons77 eliminated the
death penalty as a sentencing option for juveniles. In Roper, the
Court focused its Eighth Amendment analysis on objective indicators
of the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,”78 while also examining the differences between adults
and juveniles in depth.79 Justice Kennedy, authoring the majority
opinion, employed a somewhat novel approach for evaluating juvenile
death penalty sentences under the Eighth Amendment.80 The first
inquiry in Roper was whether or not there existed a national consensus on standards of decency regarding the juvenile death penalty
demonstrated by objective evidence.81 For such objective indicia, the
Court looked to (1) the rejection of the practice in the majority of
states; (2) the infrequency of its use in jurisdictions where it remained on the books; and (3) the consistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice.82
After finding a definitive trend nationally and internationally for
the abolition of the juvenile death penalty,83 the Court then evaluated
whether or not juveniles’ reduced culpability, increased susceptibility
to influence, and inability to control their surroundings ultimately
warranted an absolute prohibition of juvenile execution.84 Weighing
these factors together, the Court concluded that juvenile offenders do
not qualify for the narrow category of persons “whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution,’ ”85 thereby abolishing the death penalty for juvenile offenders.86
But while the Roper Court used the “national consensus” doctrine
for abolishing the death penalty for juveniles, this concept first made
its appearance in 1958 in Trop v. Dulles,87 where Justice Frankfurter,
in his dissent, noted that a century of what he considered objective
evidence (namely federal practice and the laws of other countries),
cut against the grain of the majority’s holding, indicating that this
should strongly influence the Court’s decision.88 Since Trop, the Court
77. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
78. Id. at 561 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).
79. Id. at 568–76.
80. See Julie Rowe, Note, Mourning the Untimely Death of the Juvenile Death Penalty:
An Examination of Roper v. Simmons and the Future of the Juvenile Justice System, 42
CAL. W. L. REV. 287, 304 (asserting that “Justice Kennedy essentially rejected the Standford Court’s [previously-established] analytical framework”).
81. Roper, 543 U.S. at 565–67.
82. Id. at 564–65.
83. Id. at 568, 575–76.
84. Feld, supra note 48, at 9–10 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70).
85. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
86. Id. at 578–79.
87. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
88. Id. at 126.
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has invoked the doctrine on a number of occasions in its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence,89 sparking considerable debate among
academicians over whether the Court should use such a majoritarian
method for its constitutional analysis.90
D. Analysis of the Decision
Prior to beginning its constitutional exegesis, the Graham opinion
opens with a brief soliloquy relating the circumstances of Terrance
Graham’s life: his parents were addicted to crack cocaine, young
Terrance was diagnosed early on with Attention Deficit Disorder, and
subsequently began alcohol and drug use at an early age.91 After explaining the events leading to Graham’s eventual conviction, sentencing, and incarceration,92 the Court began its constitutional analysis.
The manner in which Justice Kennedy arrives at the Court’s holding is interesting in that he essentially combines two different jurisprudential concepts to create a third—which is the Court’s ultimate
ruling. First, Justice Kennedy looked to Kennedy v. Louisiana93 for
the strict proportionality concept between crime and punishment. In
Kennedy, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment proportionality
principle forbids the execution of an offender for the nonhomicide
rape of a child, finding that the Court must adhere to a rule that reserves use of the death penalty only “for crimes that take the life of
the victim,”94 with the Court in Graham seemingly declaring the
nonhomicidal nature of an offense as being a mitigating factor.
The second prong of the Court’s analysis began with Justice Kennedy stating, “Roper established that because juveniles have lessened
culpability they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.”95
89. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 562–64; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-16, 321–23; Stanford
v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370–73 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 331, 334–35
(1989); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987).
90. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using
State Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1089,
1113 (2006) (positing that in taking a majoritarian approach, the Court only enforces constitutional protections where they are least needed); Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,” 57 UCLA L. REV 365 (2009) (asserting that the Court
takes a majoritarian approach in other civil liberties contexts, warranting use and consideration of the practice by scholars and practitioners); Michael S. Moore, Morality in Eighth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 63 (2008) (taking the position
that a right against a majority is no right at all when the same majority interprets such
right); Richard M. Ré, Can Congress Overturn Kennedy v. Louisiana?, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1031 (2010) (concluding that Congress could possibly overturn the Court’s ban on
execution for rape by playing to the Court’s national consensus jurisprudence).
91. The opening of the opinion seems important in setting the tone for the Court’s
later use of a person’s individual characteristics and circumstances during constitutional
evaluation of his or her sentence.
92. See supra Section II.A.
93. 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
94. Id. at 2665.
95. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
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The Court then combined the rules from Roper and Kennedy to create
a third, which ultimately informs the Court’s ruling: “It follows that,
when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not
kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability.”96 This
method of constitutional analysis may prove to have far-reaching
consequences, as it seems to somewhat remedy the “tension between
general rules and case-specific circumstances” that the Court noted
in Kennedy.97 Under the rationale employed in Graham, the Court
seems to unify many of its previously disjointed principles of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.
III. APPLICATION TO ADULT SENTENCES
Commentary recently cautioned that zealous anti-death penalty
advocacy may serve to “obscure or normalize pathologies that afflict
non-capital criminal punishment.”98 However, the holding in Graham
seems contrary to this assertion, as the Court revived its proportionality doctrine to find Terrance Graham’s LWOP sentence unconstitutional. But the three variables relied upon by the majority opinion in Graham—the seriousness of LWOP (the sentence), conviction
for a nonhomicide offense (the offense), and Graham’s status as a juvenile (the offender), may ultimately limit applicability of the opinion to
other contexts, namely in the review of adult LWOP sentences.
Within this Section, however, I posit that Graham’s rationale can and
should be applied when reviewing noncapital LWOP adult sentences, as
the theoretical and factual underpinnings of the factors in Graham
would seem to support broader application, hopefully unifying the mess
that seemingly is the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.99
96. Id. at 2027.
97. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2659 (citing Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973 (1994)).
98. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Opening a Window or Building a Wall? The
Effect of Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Law and Advocacy on Criminal Justice More
Broadly, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 177 (2008). The authors posited that the increased
focus on reducing capital sentencing throughout the U.S. could ultimately result in more
stringent application of LWOP sentencing. See id. at 204–05.
99. Unfortunately, many assert that the Court’s Eighth Amendment proportionality
jurisprudence is a “mess.” See Tom Stacy, Cleaning up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 475 (2005) (arguing that the Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence “is plagued by deep inconsistencies concerning the Amendment’s text, the
Court’s own role, and a constitutional requirement of proportionate punishment” and is
simply a “mess”); see, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, Note, The Supreme Court’s Backwards
Proportionality Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal
Punishments and Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249, 1251-53 (2000)
(arguing that the Court’s refusal to subject custodial sentences to searching proportionality
review is incompatible with its increasing scrutiny of punitive damages awards); Steven
Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing: The Supreme Court’s Tortured
Approach to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 84 KY. L.J. 107, 107 (1996) (arguing that the
Court’s proportionality jurisprudence is “confused”); Donna H. Lee, Resuscitating
Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527, 528 (2008)
(arguing that the last twenty-five years of Supreme Court proportionality decisions “do
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A. Variable One: The Sentence
Arguably, the most important variable to assert in urging the application of Graham to noncapital adult LWOP sentences is the
analogous nature of the sentence itself. In the only successful proportionality challenge before the Court for a LWOP sentence prior to
Graham, the Solem Court established a somewhat bright line dichotomy between capital and noncapital cases, with Justice Scalia’s lambasting of proportionality review in Harmelin further driving a dividing wedge between the two classifications, largely because of the
“death is different” rationale.100 Thus, prior to Graham, the likelihood
for application of the Court’s proportionality analysis to adult LWOP
seemed somewhat dubious.
However, many commentators assert that the incarceration experience has become dramatically harsher in recent years: prisoners
are regularly raped, beaten, and deprived completely of human contact.101 These consequences of incarceration are seen in both the juvenile and adult contexts.102 Part of the problem is that prisons have
been overcrowded for decades, with states unable to keep up with the
increasing demand for prison cells.103 This overcrowding has led to a
litany of serious problems, including increased incidents of serious
inmate violence, as well as the spread of infectious diseases.104 Overnot provide practical guidance or a coherent theoretical framework for analyzing
proportionality challenges”).
100. “[Prison sentences] cannot be compared with death,” wrote Justice Scalia, stating
that the Court had “drawn the line of required individualized sentencing at capital cases, and
s[aw] no basis for extending it further.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991).
The “death is different” rationale has been a part of the Court’s jurisprudence for decades:
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in
degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice.
And it is unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in
our concept of humanity.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
101. See, e.g., Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane
Punishment to Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111 (2007) (discussing the
various manners in which prisoners are treated inhumanely while in prison, such as: prisoner rape, contraction of life-threatening diseases, and physical abuse); James E. Robertson, A Punk’s Song About Prison Reform, 24 PACE L. REV. 527 (2004) (biographical article
of prison inmate who contracted AIDS after being made to perform sexual acts in prison).
102. See Connie de la Vega & Michelle Leighton, Sentencing Our Children to Die in
Prison: Global Law and Practice, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 983 (2008).
103. Carla I. Barrett, Does the Prison Rape Elimination Act Adequately Address the
Problems Posed by Prison Overcrowding? If Not, What Will?, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 391, 39192 (2005).
104. Susanna Y. Chung, Note, Prison Overcrowding: Standards in Determining Eighth
Amendment Violations, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2351 (2000) (examining problems with prison
overcrowding); Peter J. Duitsman, Comment, The Private Prison Experiment: A Private
Sector Solution to Prison Overcrowding, 76 N.C. L. REV. 2209, 2211 (1998) (discussing that
overcrowding has increased the instances of violence and infectious diseases).
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crowding in prisons has also produced injurious physical conditions,
inadequate sanitation, and decreased availability of basic necessities
such as staff supervision and medical services.105 Further, it was
found that prison overcrowding poses a serious threat to increasing
prisoner suicide, psychiatric problems, and the number of disciplinary infractions.106 Separate and aside from the overcrowding issue,
current prison practices severely damage inmates not only physically, but also mentally, creating serious mental disorders and abnormalities not present before entering prison.107
As the Court in Graham unequivocally stated, “life without parole
sentences share some characteristics with death sentences,” because
the sentence “alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable” since there is deprivation “of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration.”108 The Court has recognized that “defendants
who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are
categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment
than are murderers.”109 Therefore, because the austerity and seriousness of the sentence itself applies equally to both juveniles and
adults, the Court should apply the reasoning of Graham to the review of adult prison sentences.
B. Variable Two: The Offender
In addition to the severity of the LWOP sentence itself, the Graham Court also examined and expounded upon the implications
raised by imposing such a sentence on a juvenile.110 The Court explained that “developments in psychology and brain science continue
to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds,”
reasoning that because a juvenile mind is still developing into late
adolescence, a juvenile’s brain is not essentially destined to be and
remain criminal, thereby indicating that LWOP is too harsh for juveniles because of the potential for reform as the offender ages and ma-

105. See Mark Andrew Sherman, Indirect Incorporation of Human Rights Treaty Provisions in Criminal Cases in United States Courts, 3 INT’L L. STUDENTS ASS’N J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 719, 730 (1997).
106. Barrett, supra note 103, at 392-93, 400.
107. See Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL’Y 325, 328-29 (2006) (discussing the mental problems arising in the prison context
resulting from the prison experience).
108. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010). The Court went on to quote a
Nevada case where a juvenile’s LWOP sentence was overturned, stating LWOP “means
denial of hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it
means that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the convict],
he will remain in prison for the rest of his days.” Id. at 2027 (alteration in original) (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Id. at 2027 (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2664-65 (2008)).
110. Id. 130 S. Ct. at 2026–33.
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tures.111 This indicates that the underlying rationale for the Court’s
analysis is that an offender’s mental state has a significant bearing
on the proportionality of a given sentence to an offender, which has
played a significant role in the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in the past.112 Therefore, an offender’s individual actual mental
capacity is seemingly what the court is focusing on, using numerical
age as a sort of de facto barometer for mental capacity. Thus, where
the mental capacity of an adult is on par with that of a child (i.e., in
cases of mental retardation), and that adult is sentenced to LWOP, it
follows that a Graham proportionality approach should apply.
For centuries, the law has provided an exception for the severely
mentally retarded, exempting them from criminal liability altogether.113 And while a mentally retarded individual is not per se exempt from criminal liability contemporarily, mental handicap has a
significant impact on an individual who finds himself involved with
the criminal justice system.114 For example, many mentally handicapped people may be less likely to withstand police coercion or pressure due to their limited communication skills, their heightened susceptibility to answer questions so as to please the questioner rather
than to answer the question accurately, and their tendency to be
submissive.115 One report estimates 6.2 to 7.5 million people with serious cognitive disabilities live in the United States,116 with the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention reporting approximately 1.5 million
people with severe intellectual disability in the U.S.117 These considerations and others have led some commentators to call for the imposition of more stringent protections for mentally handicapped offenders.118
111. Id. at 2026.
112. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). In Atkins, the Court categorically
banned the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders as cruel and unusual, stating:
“[t]heir deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability.” Id. at 318; see also Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins
Could Mean for People with Mental Illness, 33 N.M. L. REV. 293 (2003) (discussing issues
with culpability and sentencing of mentally handicapped individuals).
113. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331–33 (1989).
114. James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 427–30 (1985).
115. Anna Scheyett, et al., Are We There Yet? Screening Processes for Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities in Jail Settings, 47 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 13,
13–14 (2009), available at http://www.aaidd.org/media/PDFs/PeoplewithIDDDinjails.pdf.
116. WISCONSIN DEP’T OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, COGNITIVE DISABILITIES IN ADULTS
WITH SPECIAL NEEDS: A RESOURCE AND PLANNING GUIDE FOR WISCONSIN’S PUBLIC LIBRARIES, 14, 20, available at http://www.dpi.state.wi.us/pld/pdf/sn04.pdf.
117. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, STATE-SPECIFIC RATES OF MENTAL
RETARDATION—UNITED STATES, 1993, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT (1996),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00040023.htm.
118. See Stephen B. Brauerman, Balancing the Burden: The Constitutional Justification for Requiring the Government to Prove the Absence of Mental Retardation Before Imposing the Death Penalty, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 401 (2004) (exploring Eighth Amendment
jurisprudential issues with those who are mentally handicapped); Lyn Entzeroth, Putting
the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant to Death: Charting the Development of a Na-
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Moreover, mental illness can severely impact an offender’s overall
mental capacity.119 According to a 2006 study conducted by the Department of Justice, 56% of inmates in state prison, 45% of inmates
in federal prison, and 64% of inmates in local jails suffer from some
form of mental illness.120 Similar to mental cognition issues such as
mental retardation, mental illness can also affect a defendants’ feelings and behaviors, as well as the nature of the defendant’s confession, and whether or not he even confesses, and, if he does, whether
or not such confession was voluntary or coerced.121 Interestingly, one
author discusses research indicating that 94% of homicide offenders,
49% to 78% of sex offenders, 61% of habitually aggressive offenders,
and 76% of juvenile offenders have some type of brain dysfunction,
which can significantly alter an offender’s ability to understand
and/or control his or her actions.122
Thus, while the Court has used an offender’s numerical age to
categorically reject LWOP for juvenile offenders under a proportionality analysis in Graham, the information adduced in this Section
demonstrates that the Court should apply the same rationale to adult
offenders where it is affirmatively demonstrated that the offender
suffers from reduced mental capacity, whether stemming from intellectual disability or mental illness, as the Court’s rationale in Graham finds its foundation in mental capacity rather than age.
C. Variable Three: The Crime
According to the Graham Court, “defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment than are murderers.”123 The Court went on to examine its own precedent, further stattional Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REV.
911 (2001) (evaluating the problems with culpability for those with mental handicaps).
119. See James S. Liebman & Michael J. Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the “Boiler Plate”: Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEO. L.J. 757
(1978). It is important to note that there is a distinction between intellectual disability and
mental illness: “[t]he mentally ill experience disturbances in their thoughts that may be
cyclical, episodic, or temporary,” as characterized by disorders such as “schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, psychosis, post-traumatic disorder, and the like,” while “[m]ental retardation
is not a psychological or medical disorder . . . [but] is a permanent developmental or functional condition. . . . [that] cannot be ameliorated by drugs or psychotherapy.” Entzeroth,
supra note 118, at 915–16.
120. DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND
JAIL INMATES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT (2006), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.
121. John M. Fabian, Death Penalty Litigation and the Role of the Forensic Psychologist, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 73, 82 (2003).
122. Richard E. Redding, Why It Is Essential to Teach About Mental Health Issues in
Criminal Law (And a Primer on How To Do It), 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 407, 417–18 (2004).
123. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010) (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128.
S. Ct. 2641, 2664–65 (2008)).
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ing that “[nonhomicide] crimes differ from homicide crimes in a moral
sense.”124 And these principles have long been recognized by the
Court, as evidenced by the Court’s holdings in Kennedy,125 Enmund,126
and Coker,127 among others.
In Solem,128 the gravity of the offense at issue was an important
factor for the Court’s analysis. Specifically, the Court enunciated the
following four principles to consider when evaluating the harm
caused by an offense: (1) crimes have varying “magnitude[s],” as reflected by statutory distinctions; (2) “a lesser included offense should
not be punished more severely than the greater offense,” thus assault should be viewed differently from assault with intent to kill; (3)
“attempts are less serious than completed crimes”; and (4) “an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a higher penalty than the
principal.”129 Moreover, commentators have opined that harms
caused by an offender’s crime fall into different categories, with
these varying categories (ranked by severity) warranting different
levels of culpability and concomitant punishment.130 Other scholars
have advanced the position that the gravity and severity of the offense in question are fundamental principles that should bare great
weight in reviving and unifying the Court’s fractured proportionality
analysis as applied to nonhomicide offenses.131
Precedent and commentary make clear that the nature of the actual crime committed by the offender is an important consideration,
and one that has, and should continue, to bear great weight on the
Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis. The Graham Court’s holding is
important as it highlights and further legitimizes the use of offense
analysis in determining proportionality.

124. Id.
125. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2665 (holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids execution for the rape of a child).
126. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (finding that the Eighth Amendment
does not allow imposition of the death penalty for a defendant who aids and abets a felony
during which murder is committed by others).
127. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 603 (1977) (holding that the sentence of death is
grossly disproportionate to the offense of raping an adult woman).
128. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
129. Id. at 293.
130. Donna H. Lee, Resuscitating Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing,
40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527, 583 (2008).
131. Id. at 527. Professor Lee suggests that “[t]he key to resuscitating proportionality
analysis in noncapital criminal sentencing lies in strengthening the rigor with which courts
analyze offense gravity and sentence severity,” and that “[p]roportionality in noncapital
criminal sentencing can be resuscitated by clarifying the theoretical framework already
contained in Supreme Court precedent.” Id. at 583.
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IV. ANCILLARY CONCERNS AND BENEFITS
As with any newly proposed avenue of analysis, critics may certainly be wary of reviving the Court’s nonhomicide proportionality
analysis and solidifying a firm base for such considerations. However, I think that the benefits of my theory outweigh the potential
drawbacks, and I will explore two of the possible criticisms that may
be raised, along with a strong ancillary benefit to my position.
A. Concerns Over Increased Litigation
At a time when judicial resources are stretched thin and state and
federal budgets are shrinking, increased litigation may strain those
resources even more. Critics may argue that creating a new method
for potential appeals would greatly increase inmate litigation and
open the proverbial floodgates with a tidal wave of habeas appeals
and the like. And it seems that Congress has evinced intent to reduce
suits by prison inmates through its passage of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act,132 providing support for such contentions. However, the
Prison Litigation Reform Act is more narrowly focused on reducing
civil litigation where money damages are sought, rather than appeals
of an inmate’s sentence;133 therefore, reliance on that particular piece
of legislation is misguided.
Further, while this Note’s theory may well produce an increase in
litigation, which would seemingly increase the costs associated with the
judicial and correctional systems, it seems that if a prisoner’s appeal
is granted and they are released or have their sentence reduced, the
state will save the costs that would have been expended in housing
the inmate.134 Therefore, whereas an increase in litigation may stretch
judicial resources in some areas, the savings to state governments
and the federal system would seemingly quickly outpace litigation costs.
B. Concerns Over Releasing Inmates Early
While in a perfect world every prisoner would be deterred from
committing future crime after being released from prison, notions of
such a positive correlation have been attacked and eroded through
years of quantitative study. Particularly, it seems that the harsh en132. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006) (evincing a strong preference for reducing inmate litigation).
133. See Lynn S. Branham, The Prison Litigation Reduction Act’s Enigmatic Exhaustion Requirement: What It Means and What Congress, Courts and Correctional Officials
Can Learn From It, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 483 (2001) (exploring the implications of the Prison Litigation Reform Act).
134. See, e.g., Timothy Curtin, The Continuing Problem of America’s Aging Prison Population and the Search for a Cost-Effective and Socially-Acceptable Means of Addressing It,
15 ELDER L.J. 473 (2007) (explaining the increased costs associated with housing an aging
prison population).
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vironments in which prisoners live while incarcerated likely increase
recidivism rates among released inmates.135 This may be a cause for
concern among many, as releasing prisoners early seemingly equates
to increasing crime rates when these former prisoners are rereleased
into the community.
However, it appears that these concerns can be assuaged by pointing out two facts, combining them into one rule, and following that
rule to its logical conclusion: (1) most inmates are likely to be released at some point in their lives, and (2) increased exposure to the
prison environment increases likelihood of recidivism.136 Taken together, these two facts mean that the longer an inmate serves time in
prison, the more likely they are to reengage in criminal behavior
when eventually released from prison. Followed to its natural conclusion, this results in the proposition that releasing inmates sooner rather than later results in a lower recidivism rate. Therefore, any concerns over releasing inmates early based on the analytical framework
proposed herein should ultimately give way to the conclusion that
earlier releases could result in lower recidivism rates.
C. The Benefit of Decreasing the U.S. Prison Population
Severe prison overcrowding has become an issue of growing concern over the past several years as inmate populations nationwide
have rapidly expanded.137 The problem has been largely attributed to
the harshness with which sentences have been handed down following sentencing policy changes in the 1970s, as state and federal inmate populations have tripled, and sentence length has doubled138
(that is, except for California, where the prison population has ballooned by 750%).139 In trying to understand the problem and posit
solutions, scholars have adduced that there are only two variables
that affect the size of the inmate population: (1) how many people go
to prison, and (2) how long they stay.140 Thus, as the overcrowding

135. See John D. Castiglione, Qualitative and Quantitative Disproportionality: A Specific Critique of Retributivism, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 71 (2010) (stating that evidence suggests
that harsh prison sentences increases recidivism); M. Keith Chen & Jesse M. Shapiro, Do
Harsher Prison Sentences Reduce Recidivism? A Discontinuity-Based Approach, 9 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 1 (2007) (explaining that their research adduces no evidence harsher confinement conditions reduce recidivism, and that such conditions seem to increase the likelihood
of re-arrest).
136. See Castiglione, supra note 135, at 78–80 (explaining that quantitative proportionality examines the length of sentence with recidivism).
137. Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Implications of the
Iron Law of Prison Populations, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 307 (2009); James Forman, Jr.,
Why Care About Mass Incarceration?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 993 (2010).
138. Clear & Austin, supra note 137, at 307–08.
139. Amanda Lopez, Coleman/Plata: Highlighting the Need to Establish An Independent Corrections Commission in California, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 97 (2010).
140. Clear & Austin, supra note 137, at 312.
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issue becomes increasingly dire by the day, courts need to develop
their future jurisprudence with an eye towards influencing these two
variables to promote a downward trend in the inmate population.
The analytical framework developed in this Note fits the bill: by
examining an offender’s sentence using the three-variable approach,
disproportionate sentences will be ratcheted down, decreasing the
amount of time an inmate stays in prison, thereby directly influencing the second variable discussed above. Lockyer v. Andrade141 provides a perfect example. In that case, Leandro Andrade was sentenced under California’s “three strikes” law. His first strike was for
misdemeanor theft and his second and third strikes were for stealing
videotapes from Kmart, eighty-five dollars worth the first time, and
seventy dollars worth the next.142 For his crimes, Andrade was sentenced to two consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life in prison
with the Supreme Court, on appeal, finding that the sentence “was
not an unreasonable application of our clearly established law,” and
that this sentence was not grossly disproportionate because it was
not an “extraordinary case” warranting relief.143 Were the framework
presented herein at work, the sentence would have been found unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment, and Andrade would
have to have been re-sentenced to a shorter prison stint.
First, the sentence, which amounted to life in prison, would have
weighed heavily in favor of disproportionality because of the severe
issues with inmate overcrowding in California and the serious problems it is causing for the citizens and inmates.144 Next, focusing on
the offender, Andrade was a serious heroine addict, and he admittedly committed his thefts to try and support his habit;145 this indicates that Andrade’s sentence should be mitigated since his actions
were strongly influenced by a serious chemical dependency. Finally,
stealing less than one hundred dollars worth of videos from Kmart146
seems to also warrant mitigation under the third prong of the analysis, the crime itself. Therefore, when triangulated and applied together, the framework posited herein would clearly reduce the
amount of time served by many inmates, ultimately resulting in a
reduced inmate population.

141. 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
142. Id. at 66.
143. Id. at 77.
144. See Lopez, supra note 139, at 97–98 (expounding on the issues associated with
California’s massive prison population).
145. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 66.
146. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Court’s fractured Eighth Amendment proportionality jurisprudence has created uncertainty and confusion among practitioners,
judges, and commentators alike. In order to remedy this pressing issue, the Court needs to adopt a proportionality framework that not
only is cohesive and comprehensive, but also applicable across a wide
and varying spectrum of offenders and crimes. By adopting the methodology presented in this Note, the Court would not only unify its
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, but would also promote justice
and fairness in sentencing throughout the United States.

